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Abstract
Helmut Schelsky (1912-19~4) is certainly one of the most
importantandinfluential Germansociologists ofthepostwar-
period. He heldprofessorial chairs in sociology in the Federal
Republic for thirty tears (1948-1978): in Hamburg, Munster,
Bielefeld and, again, Munster. Owing to the lack of
translations Schelsky is, however, not very wellknown in the
English-speaking world. It's also difficult to point out one or
two principal writings from his hand; rather we have to do
with a continuous stream ofpublications on a wide range of
topics. 1 In this article, however, I'll focus on Schelsky's
controversialpostdoctoral thesis on Thomas Hobbes, whichhe
presented ontheeveoftheSecond WorldWar. Mydiscussion is
furthermore intended as a contribution to the much wider
theme: German intellectuals and NationalSocialism.
I.
In February 1939 Schelsky defended his postdoctoral thesis in
philosophy and sociology on Hobbes at the University of
Konigsberg. It was planned and prepared to appear as a book in
1942, but due to war circumstances it never did. Not until a few
years before his death did Schelsky decide to publish the
manuscript in an unchanged form. It appeared in 1981 under the
title Thomas Hobbes. Einepolitische Lebre?
In a new preface Schelsky quite openly states that at the time of
writing and rewriting his thesis (1938-1940) he was in no wayan
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opponent of National Socialism. On the contrary his work on
Hobbes was in his own view a way of summing up his
experiences from the university seminars and political activity as
an engaged young Nazi student. At the same time he insists that
serious independent scientific work in a liberal spirit was still
possible. Hwe take Schelsky at his word, his thesis on Hobbes is
and was intended as both a kind of Nazi philosophy and as a
scientific work in a liberal vein.
Schelsky arrived at Leipzig as a young man in 1932 and
immediately came under the spell of the "revolution from the
right" as advocated by his teachers Hans Freyer (1887-1969) and
Arnold Gehlen (1904-197(».3 Especially the latter became
Schelsky's much admired teacher and friend. Already during his
first year in Leipzig Schelsky joined the National Socialist
Student Association and, for two years, the Storm troops (S.A.).
He took part in the Reichsparteitagen in Niirnberg in 1933, 1934
and 1935,and worked from 1933for the Amt Rosenberg. In 1934
he published asmall work on Sozialistische Lebenshaltung and one
year later defended his doctoral thesis on Theone der
Gemeinschaft nach Fichtes Naturrecbt von 1796. Another two
years later, in May 1937, he joined the National Socialist Party
and the following year the N ational Socialist Teachers
Association. Schelsky worked as an assistant for Gehlen first in
Leipzig (1934-38) and then in Konigsberg (1938-40) and for
Freyer in Budapest (1940-41). From the Summer 1941 he took
part as soldier and officer in the campaign on the Eastern front.
The original preface to Thomas Hobbes. Eine politische Lehre is
dated "In the field, 1941."4
The above-mentioned original preface is interesting for several
reasons (cf. 13f.). It informs us that the work has its origin in a
controversy between the author and Carl Schmitt over "the
German Hobbes interpretation in its opposition to the West-
European interpretation."? What's specific about this "German"
Hobbes interpretation, the text also informs us, is that it doesn't
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reduce scientific theories and doctrines to merely statements
about reality, but takes them to be essentially related to and
rooted in human action. To show this relatedness and rootedness
is furthermore said to be "the task of philosophy in our time,"
with the reservation that " the methods of this thinking are
manifold."6 Schelsky presents his intention to treat Hobbes as a
contemporary, to understand him "philosophically and
politically...in the light of the forces of the present," rathe~ than
treating him historically as a figure of the past. The actuality of
Hobbes is seen in the fact that he was a pronounced opponent to
the "System" that erected its dominion in Europe with the
Glorious Revolution in 1688. A question of utmost importance
then becomes not what is wrong in Hobbes' doctrine, but "what
is lacking there." But at the center of the presentation are,
according to Schelsky, the "truths" to be found in Hobbes
doctrine, and the picture of a political theorist of "European
significance."
Paraphrasing Nietzsche it can be said: This is not (only) a preface,
this is dynamite! It furthermore poses the question if Schelsky's
work can be all the above-mentioned and still be an independent
scientific work in a liberal spirit (asthe prefacefrom 1981states).
II.
Well into the text Schelsky speaks of "two important keys" to the
understanding of Hobbes' political philosophy (cf. 279): on the
one hand its "anthropological foundation," on the other hand the
fact that it addresses the "citizen" and intends to have a certain
"effect" on him." I will proceed backwards and start with the
latter key and from there move on to the first.
Hobbes' standpoint, as interpreted by Schelsky, can be
summarized in the following way (cf. 321ff.): a doctrine that
intends to have a formative influence on men has to orient itself
by its recipients and the means to reach and act on them, must
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further take into consideration the situation at the time, and not
least who the opponents are and how to counteract their
influence. Hobbes' adressee is the citizen (not the ruler as is the
case for Machiavelli), his intention is to develop a disposition of
loyalty to the state, i.e., to make the citizen freely accept the rule
he is subjected to. Hobbes' primary antagonist is the Pope as
representing a competing claim to power, his primary means of
struggle are to establish a state consciousness founded not on
religion but on science. In this sense Hobbes' political
philosophy wants to be both a political doctrine and a political
deed.8 For this reason Hobbes is furthermore said to be the
"precursor of a political science that only today is becoming
visible in outline" (44).
Carl Schmitt, in his book on Hobbes from 1938) diagnosed a
"break" in Hobbes' doctrine. For Schmitt the great Leviathan is
a symbol of political unity, of the overcoming of the anarchic
state of nature, of the victory over the forces that undermine the
power of the State. In exchange for obedience the State offers its
citizens protection. However, Hobbes then introduced a
distinction between faith and confession, between "inner" and
"outer," making faith into an inner, private realm in relation to
which the State remains neutral; according to Schmitt he opened
up a space for free discourse which soon became the platform for
organized societal interests-ehurches, political parties, trade
unions etc.-embarking on a struggle for state power, finally
making Leviathan a servant of these "indirect" powers."
Schelsky's rejoinder reads: there is no such break in Hobbes'
doctrine (cf. 312f. and 412f.).IO Hobbes doesn't leave room for an
inner unpolitical space and thereby doesn't open the door for
pluralistic powers that finally lead to an end of the unity of the
State. His state is not neutral towards what takes place in foro
interno of its citizens, rather it ascribes to itself the "right to lead"
(427; italics in original) and to give a content to the consciousness
of its citizens. What Hobbes, according to Schelsky, has in mind
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is the opposite of a neutral retreat into an unpolitical inner space,
it is rather the politicalization of man's whole existence. The goal
of the state is to establish a concrete order in the form of an "order
of values" (382)-today, Schelsky adds, we would rather talk
about a Weltanschauung-and a corresponding order of life. This
concrete order must be anchored among the citizens as habit,
conduct and disposition. In this wayan identity i~ established
between ruler and ruled, between state and nation. "The
democratic consent to dominion, that Hobbes' doctrine of the
state contract presents, is at the same time a consent to the
domination or leading ofconsciousness [BewuBtseinsbeherrschung
bzw. -fiihrung]!" (427) Democracy for Hobbes means, in
Schelsky's interpretation, the recognition of state authority by
the people, not the exerciseof it. In this way power is transformed
into right, and it's no longer adequate to talk of.obedience pure
and simple on the part of the citizens in relation to the State, but
"rather of "voluntary obedience" or "allegiance [Treue der
Gefolgschaft]" (330). To make the citizens identify with the State
is the primary effect that Hobbes' doctrine of politics has in view.
For the modern state everything depends, according to Schelsky,
on how well it succeeds in this task; it can only develop its power
in accordance with-not against-its citizens. Thus we live in a
democratic age (with the reservation that democracy is not
identical with parliamentary democracy). However in the
Western hemisphere it's not the Hobbesian understanding of
democracy that has been triumphant, but "the Western states
haven't yet come to an end in their discussion of this issue" (423).
Writing in the year 1941, it's quite clear that for Schelsky the
question of democracy involved far more than a seminar class.
Hobbes is, according to Schelsky, well aware that the formation
of a unitary political will in the citizens is a product of political
will formation on part of the State, that it amounts to a formation
of dispositions from above. The basic fault of Hobbes' political
philosophy however is said to be that he thought such a
disposition on part of the State could be brought forth by means
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of rational argumentation; "there is no philosophically produced
State disposition" (412). On the other hand it's not the free
formation of public opinion either that Schelsky has in mind for
reaching a political consensus; with Schmitt (and Hobbes) he is
acutely aware that societal interests lurks behind every
expression of opinion (cf. 425£.). Instead political consensus is
rather reached by way of State propaganda, mass psychology,
folk education or, in one word, discipline [Zucht]. To bring forth
and direct a concrete weltanschauung is for Schelsky not only the
most essential right of rulership, but also the most important
duty of rulership (cf. 382). What is lacking in Hobbes is
furthermore concrete historical goals for the State and thereby
also for the citizens that identify themselves with this State (cf.
412). On other occasions Schelsky points out the lack of a
philosophy of history in Hobbes (cf. 92) or states that Hobbes
limited himself to laying down the presuppositions of the
domestic politics for a foreign policy with "national, historical
and spatially conditioned [raumbedingten] goals" (329). The
concrete goals of the State as a historically situated community is
determined by the existing historical situation and by its racial
foundation (cf. 31f., 34). The hints that Schelsky gives on the
right to assert itself on behalf of the nation and the State, the right
to a lebensraum, can hardly be said to be at odds with the actual
policy of the German Reich at the time (cf. 387f., 434).
III.
The foundation of Hobbes' doctrine of the State according to
Schelsky is laid by his anthropology. The doctrine of the State is
the politicalization of the hitter involving the move from
descriptive to prescriptive theory.
Schelsky's approach is typological: based on the way they relate to
human action he distinguishes between different pictures of man
[Menschenbilder]. Every political doctrine rests on and
presupposes a certain picture of man, moreover it's true or false
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only in relation to that picture of man (cf. 19£.). Initially Schelsky
distinguishes between two basic pictures of man: the ontological
and the dynamic. The first ascribes to man a certain nature
independent of his action, the latter sees in man's conscious
action his very essence, i.e., man is what he makes of himself. In
a second round Schelsky distinguishes between optimistic and
pessimistic pictures of man (ontological), and. betwe:n
intellectualistic and activistic pictures of man (dynamic). I WIll
here concentrate on the latter distinction. The basic option in
this case is: either the universal and eternal (reason, God etc.)
stands in the foreground as the goal of human activity or the
emphasis is upon a given concrete situation and a given concrete
f · d · 11past as points of departure for human, uture or~e~te ,actlo~.
Whereas the former assignsto man the task or missron to realize
the State of reason or God's empire on earth, the latter knows of
nothing eternal in man, no predetermined goal of human
activity, but only of the concrete acts by which man secures his
own existence and propels himself into the future. Hobbes,
according to Schelsky, represents neither a pessimistic nor an
intellectualistic picture of man, but an activistic one. For the
activist man's self-preservation is an unsolved problem and a task
that demands from man an orientation towards the future for the
sake of securing not only his bare survival but also a human way
of life in a community. Furthermore: "For him [the activist]
thought has in no way a precedence over action, but is rather a
function of his active life. Different theories of thought are
possible here which however all agree that thought in relation to
acting plays the role of serving, advising, assisting, directing, in
short, that it's there for the sake of action." (36; cp. 44ff.)
Now according to Schelsky the doctrine that every political
doctrine presupposes one of the pictures of man mentioned
above is itself a political doctrine, insofar asit rests on a particular
picture of man, namely, an activistic one. Those who argue that
political doctrines, whose object are in a broad sense human
action in state and society, are rooted in different pictures of man,
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above all in the way they conceive of human action, have in fact
already opted for an activistic picture of man. It's accordingly in
the light of an activistic picture of man that anthropology
becomes of central importance for the understanding of political
doctrines.
At a certain risk of getting lost in Schelsky's detailed and nuanced
interpretation of Hobbes' anthropology, I want to briefly bring
out three central components (cf. Part Two): a) The importance
of language as the dividing line between man and animal. With
human language man is for Hobbes given the ability to count
(i.e., to abstraction), the ability to teach and to communicate
with others, and the ability to give and take orders as well as to
make promises. b) Closely related to the use of language is action
according to plan. Man has the capability to overview the
intention and goal of action, i.e., to act according to a
preconceived plan. The basic form for such action according to
plan is the technique. Language at the same time makes possible
and is at the disposal of man's interaction with his environment.
This interrelatedness of language and deed is "the keystone of
Hobbes' doctrine of man" (59). c) Furthermore, man is power as
a beingable to. Given his lack of a once and for all fixed nature,
man has to secure his own existence through action, through his
own power by finding out or knowing how and his capability to
carry through his plans. In continuation with this anthropologi-
cal concept of power isthe political asthe ability to carry through
action oriented towards the future according to plan against
other plans of action oriented towards the future.
The above-mentioned concepts form the basis of an
anthropology that in all aspects centres around human action as
the execution of a preconceived plan: thought is primarily related
to action, volition is the action itself as related back upon a
previous deliberation, and free is that action which proceeds
unimpeded accordingto plan. All human capabilities and powers
are involved and interact with one another by the fulfillment of
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a premeditated action. Methodologically this means the rejection
of any attempt to understand or 'deduce' human nature from
some inherited character or a particular ability taken in isolation.
If one author were singled out to whom there is almost
exclusively positive references in Schelsky's work on Hobbes
that would probably be John Dewey.12 To give just two
examples: in relation to Dewey's doctrine of deliberation and
choice of action, Schelsky talks about "an astonishing parallel to
Hobbes" (167), and, more generally, he finds "a large degree of
correspondence in the substantial statements and the definition
of concepts" (142) between Hobbes and Dewey in their
respective anthropologies (see also 35f., 38, 158£., 161£f., 168,
182f., 189f., 429). These positive references are not surprising in
so far as the American pragmatist also is said to represent an
activistic picture of man. They are however surprising in so far as
Schelsky at the time understood himself as a N ational Socialist
and Dewey's name is closely associated with American
democracy." In what follows I want to complicate matters
further by drawing a line to the praxeology of Pierre Bourdieu.
In an interview some years ago Bourdieu answered the question
if there isn't a parallel between his theory of habitus and
especially Dewey's pragmatism:
Indeed, the affinities and convergences are quite striking,
and I believeI understand what their basisis: my effort to
react against a deep-seatedintellectualism characteristic of
all European philosophies (with the rare exceptions of
Wittgenstein, Heidegger and -Merleau-Ponty) determined
me, unwittingly, to move very close to philosophical
currents that the European tradition of "depth" and
obscurity is inclined to treat as foils, negative reference
points. 14
No doubt Bourdieu could also have mentioned Schelsky (and
Gehlen-and perhaps even Hobbes) as "rare exceptions" to the
dominant European tradition. Therefore it's hardly surprising
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that the notion of habitus is to be found in Schelsky too (d. 181,
186£., 190f., 195, 271, 275ff., 278, 282f.). It makes its appearance
in connection with his discussion of man's bearing (in German
Haltung as the translation of Hobbes's latin word ingenium). A
specific habitus or bearing becomes visible in the long run; it
doesn't predetermine any particular action, but as something
incorporated, an acquired immediacy, a disposition to act in
certain ways, it puts its mark on the sequence of actions that
makes up a human life. The bearing doesn't act mechanically, but
rather through the intellect; as a predetermining power it "plays
a role in the deliberation, constitute its rules and standards, by
which it measures things and inwardly puts them to test" (185).15
Perhaps one could speak of a conditioned freedom, in so far as
our habitus both limits the field of possible actions and makes
possible certain ways of action. "The past life of man is a
predetermining and limiting power, but also present in every
action as an effortless ability at one's disposal." (184) A
connection between the notion of habitus and the previously
mentioned formation of a State consciousness is established in
the following way:
Because the habitus of all actions constitute ethical life
[Sittlichkeit], and the former is produced through habit,
education and continual influence from authority, the State
or ruling power in truth produces the disposition ofmen or
can at least produce and in a sense exhort it, because the
production in the widest sense of the word is alone or can at
least be in the hand of the State. (278-9)
In my view it's justified to talk of a rather surprising family
resemblance between Schelsky's "German" Hobbes interpreta-
tion, Dewey's pragmatism and Bourdieu's praxeology as far as
basic anthropological assumptions are concerned. At the same
time they differ radically in their respective political or
ideological tendencies: National Socialism, American democracy
and French Leftism. This is a puzzling finding. From more or less
common ground the three authors diverge in very different
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directions. What does this imply concerning the relation
between anthropology and politics?
Schelsky, in his own self-understanding, when he wrote his thesis
on Hobbes was a National Socialist-although, ashe writes in the
preface from 1981, with "a very subjective interpretation of its
contents" (9). In Hobbes' philosophy he saw on the one hand a
descriptive anthropology and on the other hand a prescriptive
doctrine of the State. The latter is further said to be the
politicalization of the former. 16 To put the questions rather
clumsy: Is Schelsky's Hobbes interpretation an example of Nazi
philosophy or ideology from beginning to end? Because ~f ~e
family resemblance between Schelsky, Dewey and Bourdieu ill
hink b · 17matters of anthropology the answer, It 1 ,must e negative.
For the very same reason there can be no necessary connection
between for example an activistic picture of man and Nazi
philosophy or ideology. Does a certain anthropology allow for
very different forms of politicalization? This is most probably
the case. How is it possible that a certain type of anthropology
allows for such very different politicalizations as our example
shows? Doesn't the anthropological foundation in any way limit
the kind of political philosophy or ideology that comes out in the
end? It would be rather strange if that wasn't the case. The
question now becomes: At what point and by which
argumentative moves does Schelsky make a turn in the direction
of Nazi philosophy or ideology? I will return to these questions
in a while, after having made a comparison on certain issueswith
Arnold Gehlen, Schelsky's teacher and long time friend.
IV.
The "German" interpretation of political doctrines, according to
Schelsky in the original preface to his thesis on Hobbes,
understand these as essentially related to and rooted in human
action. The "methods" of this thinking are however said to be
"manifold." A year before Schelsky wrote his preface Gehlen
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published a large-scale study in philosophical anthropology that
was soon to become famous: Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine
Stellung in der Welt (1940). The concept of human action is
certainly at the forefront of Gehlen's interpretation of man, but
his basic approach differs radically from Schelsky's. Instead of a
typology of pictures of man we find an empiricalphilosophy that,
building on the findings of the empirical sciences, puts forward
hypotheses on man's nature and place in the world. The picture
of man that such an empirical philosophy develops is
antimetaphysical in the sense of being essentially provisional,
fallible and open for revision.
There is reason to believe that Gehlen relatively early felt the
attraction of National Socialism. A letter from August 1931
shows him involved in the project of writing a kind of handbook
presenting "the philosophy of National Socialism." There exists
fragments of a manuscript from the yeats 1933/34 showing
Gehlen still at work on that project. A central idea that he
intended to develop seems to have been that "behind the theories
of race...is to be found the myth of race," because the core and
substance of every weltanschauung that "grips hold of the whole
of man" (GA 3, 792)is the myth. 18It's not a farfetched conclusion
to assume the influence of Sorel behind this theory of the myth
of race as a mobilizing force in men's life.
GeWen's pro-Nazi attitude seems to have culminated in 1935,
slowly giving way to a more distanced and ambivalent attitude. 19
Be that as it may, Gehlen on all circumstances made a brilliant
career during the Nazi regime, although not quite free from
problems and set backs.He joined the National Socialist Party in
May 1933, the National Socialist Teachers Association in August
the same year. At the age of thirty he became professor of
philosophy in Leipzig, four years later, 1938, his professorship
was transferred to Konigsberg, and another two years later he
took up a position in Vienna. In 1942 he became chairman of the
German Philosophical Association. But there was resistance
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from the Nazi-authorities to his appointment as professor in
Leipzig, and he was severely criticized by the Nazi-philos~ph~r
Ernst Krieck in 1935 and 1940, and the handbook for studies In
philosophy that he wrote in 1944 wasn't allowed to be
published."
If we turn to Gehlen's principal work in philosophical
anthropology from 1940'we find, just as we found in Schelsky's
work on Hobbes, a great number of references to Dewey and
American pragmatism. In comparison to Schelsky these
references are however more ambivalent: on the one hand very
positive, on the other hand polemical. "The view of pragmatism
is to prefer to all others because it is so far the only philosophy
that of principle looks upon man as an acting being." (GA 3, 347)
Gehlen doesn't hesitate to acknowledge the great merits of a
philosophical approach that close~y relates consci~usness an?
knowing-to human action and making, At the same time there IS
a general tendency to claim that a pragmatist line of thought is to
be found already by the main figures of German Idealism and by
Schopenhauer (cf. GA 3, 346, 580, 635, 640f.).21 Furthermore
Gehlen becomes very critical of American pragmatism at the
moment it "wants to be more than just a pragmatic theory of
knowledge, namely polemical enlightenment" (GA 3, 656; for
the following see 356f. and 655-9). He finds in James and Dewey
an "enlightenment optimism," a too strong belief that "rational
science or philosophy" can give orientation in life and bring forth
a "rational social order." Instead of embracing a "pragmatic
rationalism" succumbing to the illusion of a self-sufficient
operational thinking, Gehlen makes himself the spokesman of a
"counter-enlightenment from the spirit of science" insisting that
human experience and the necessity to act goes further than
science and the possibility of knowing, and that therefore science
too is in need of "guidance [Fiihrung]" that takes its point of
departure exactly from that "broad experience" which goes
beyond the scope of science. The corrective of an
"intellectualism" that loses contact with basic human needs and
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necessities lies in the "necessity of guidance: education,
discipline, self-discipline, leadership and rulership."
Here we arrive at the "supreme systems of guidance [oberste
Fiihrungssysteme]," as the title of the last chapter in the book
from 1940 reads, and thereby is meant religions and
weltanschauungen (see GA 3,709-743).22 Those systems relates to
the whole of man and secures the satisfaction of certain
elementary and eternal needs and interests, such as man's need
for an interpretation of the world and himself, man's need for
guidance of action [Handlungsfiihrung] and formation of
character [Charakterformierung], and, finally, man's need for
means to cope with his constitutional vulnerability and
powerlessness. In more ancient times a religion was at the same
time a weltanschauung, whereas in modern times science has
tended to monopolize the interpretative task and leaves to
religion, in a more or less individualized form, the third task: to
take-care of man's soul. The second task is today fulfilled by non-
religious weltanschauungen: by way of natural ethics and politics
they give guidance to action and form character. Moreover
according to Gehlen it's "in Germany proved as a matter of fact
that an immanent disciplinary ideal order [Zuchtbild] is capable
of establishing and carrying through basic principles of action, to
establish a stable organization for the growth and achievements
of the people, as well as point to and realize necessary, common
tasks" (GA 3, 739). This is the primary task for a National
Socialist weltanschauung and for the National Socialist state. 23
Given Gehlen's insistence on a weltanschauung that forms the
character and gives guidance to action, the question of the
capacity and goals of education must be of utmost importance. In
an article from 1941 entitled Anlage, Vererbung und Erziehung,
Gehlen comes to speak of what "the German idea of education"
(GA 3, 864)involves. Just as the content of every other education
is dictated by the historical situation of the national community,
i.e., politically motivated, so is the German. The German idea of
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education according to Gehlen has for its overarching goals on
the one hand the development of expertise in a particular field
[Fachmenschentum] and on the other hand the preservation of
the national community. The concrete content is provided
through the national weltanschauung, and as destined to lead the
whole people this "must therefore be simple, must in a few words
point out the task, the opponent, and the duties" (865). The
conclusion seems to be that education in Germany has to be not
only subordinated but also instrumental to the historical
situation and the concrete order of the State, and that the idea of
its tasks is articulated through the weltanschauung of the State.
"The national community demands not simply the self-
abandonment of the individual, but active, permanent, judicious
and disciplined self-abandonment." (865)
v.
Although Schelsky's and Gehlen's basic approaches differs
radically-typology of pictures of man vs. empirical philoso-
phy-they are both representatives of an anti-intellectualistic
orientation in theory, arguing for the primacy of human action,
that abstract thought is there for the sake of action and not the
other way around. This brings them close to pragmatist and
praxeological approaches. They also both insist on the necessity
of the formation of human character by way of education,
discipline, self-discipline, leadership and rulership. They further
both insist on the need for a weltanschauung on behalf of the State
that furnishes the supreme guidance of the citizens. The
formation of a State disposition is perhaps the central task of the
State, thereby securing itself a democratic legitimacy (although
not in the sense of Western democracy). Such a legitimacy is
secured if the State succeeds in laying down goals which the
citizens are willing to acknowledge and identify with. Schelsky
and Gehlen becomes the spokesmen of a counter-enlightenment
through insisting that there is no scientifically produced State
disposition, and that science too is in need of guidance. The
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IFor a short overview of Schelsky's life and work see my article
"Transcendental Theory of Society, Anthropology and the Sociology of Law:
Helmut Schelsky - An Almost Forgotten Sociologist," Acta Sociologica 40
(1997), 279-290.
2Helmut Schelsky, Thomas Hobbes. Einepolitische Lehre, Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot, 1981.If not otherwise stated all references in the following are to
this work.
3Hans Freyer was professor first in sociology (1925-1933) and then in
political sciences (1933-1938). In 1931 he published the book Revolution von
rechts. Gehlen is presented later in the text.
"The information is put together from George Leaman, Heidegger im
Kontext. Gesamtuberblick zum NS-Engagement der Universitatsphilosophen,
Hamburg & Berlin: Argument-Verlag, 1993, 74f. and Bernhard Schafers,
"Person und Institution. In Memoriam Helmut Schelskys (14. Oktober 1912-
24. Februar 1984)," Kiilner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 36
(1984), 420f. Schelsky writes himself about the intellectual situation at the
University of Leipzig, including his own development, in "Zur
41
Social Thought &Research
weltanschauung of the State takes into account the broader
experience of the national community and sets up the goals and
determines the tasks of the State on the basis of the given concrete
historical situation. The need of the State and the national
community to secure their existence and a certain way of life for
its citizens has an absolute priority. Everything else would be a
relapse into intellectualism. "In the presupposition," Schelsky
writes when he for once criticizes Dewey, "that the State is to be
formed according to the knowledge of its true essence ...Western
democracy is platonic" (441). Thus from different starting points
and. ~ollowing different paths Schelsky and Gehlen end up in
positions that closely resemble each other and could be said to
make one bid on what constitutes a National Socialist
weltanschauung.24
VI.
In conclusion: To argue that Schelsky's "German" Hobbes
interpretation has nothing to do with the author's National
~ocialistengagementseems to be simply wrong. To argue that it
~s through and through National Socialist philosophy or
Ideology alsoseemsto be simply wrong. Hthe latter were the case
I don't know how to account for the parallels to Dewey and
Bourdieu as concerns basic anthropological assumptions.
Generally, I think the qualification of theories as 'in their very
essence' or 'through and through' of such and such a character
~ore often shows an ideological concern than an analytical
interest. So obviously the truth is to be found somewhere
~etween the two extremes. This raises a general methodological
Issue that goes far beyond Schelsky's interpretation of Hobbes:
How to proceed in the analysis of works that seems to have both
aphilosophicalsubstance and a strong ideological bent? To sort out
the findi~gs into t~o neat boxes is probably an impossible
undertaking, Most likely every basic theoretical approach has a
certain flexibility and can be developed in different directions
Gust as a common position can be reached by different paths).
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Along the way options are made that adds up to very different
outcomes as concerns ideological tendencies. On the other hand
the options are most probably made in the light of ideological
convictions or commitments that were there from the beginning,
which brings a certain circularity into the theoretical construct.
The flexibility of theoretical approaches however is hardly
unlimited. Given certain basic theoretical options not any
ideological outcome is possible without violent argumentative
moves.
Schelsky's "German" Hobbes interpretation must in my view be
read as an effort to take the philosophical meaning of National
Socialism seriously. It's a work on a political theorist of the past,
but it's just as much a work about the present. For Schelsky there
is a philosophical path to National Socialism, not a compelling
one, but certainly one that doesn't lack coherence and
consequence in its argumentation. It starts out from an anti-
intellectualism and an activistic picture of man, and it ends in an
activistic state doctrine and an insistence on the formation of a
State disposition by way of discipline.
Notes
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Entstehungsgeschichte der bundesdeutschen Soziologie. Ein Brief an Rainer
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Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols (1938).
6This is a reference to Gehlen's empirically oriented philosophical
anthropology which after the war also became Schelsky's intellectual point of
departure (cf. 11).
7Looking back at his Hobbes interpretation forty years later, Schelsky
emphasizes the same two aspects as of importance also for contemporary
Hobbes scholarship (cf. 8).
8Here Schelsky, inspired by Hans Freyer's studies on Machiavelli (cf. 8), in
my view comes very close to the kind of approach in the history of political
ideas that today is strongly associated with Quentin Skinner.
9Cf. Carl Schmitt, DerLeviathan in derStaatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn
und Fehlschlag eines politiscben Symbols, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982, ch. 5-6.
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See his epilogue "Zum 'Leviathan' von Carl Schmitt" in Carl Schmitt, Der
Leviathan in derStaatslebre des Thomas Hobbes, 195.
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12Schelsky's primary reference is to the German translation of Human
Nature and Conduct (1922). In the introduction to his collection of essays Auf
der Suche nach Wirklichkeit.· (Dusseldorf-Koln: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1965)
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is the reception of the writings of Leo Strauf (cf. 217f., 263, 280f., 316).
130n one occasion Schelsky talks about Dewey as an "uncurable democrat"
(441) in the sense of that Western democracy he himself strongly repudiates. On
the reception of American pragmatism in Germany see Hans Joas,
"Amerikanischer Pragmatismus und deutsches Denken. Zur Geschichte eines
Millverstandnisses," Pragmatismus und Gesellschaftstheorie, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992, 114-145.Joas, with a certain astonishment, establishes
the very positive and insightful reception of James and Dewey in the 1930s
among a group of intellectuals with sympathies for National Socialism, and
especially points to Eduard Baumgarten, who had spent six years in America in
the 1920s and in the following decade wrote on pragmatism on a high level (see
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esp. Die geistigen Grundlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens. Bd. 2. Der
Pragmatismus. R. W Emerson, W [ames.]. Dewey (1938). For Baumgarten, as for
Schelsky and Gehlen, pragmatism according to Joas "served the purpose of an
activistic ideology" (129).Schelsky quotes Baumgarten once with approval (cf.
422).
"Pierre Bourdieu & Loic J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive
Sociology, Oxford: Polity Press, 1992, 122. No doubt there is an anthropology
underlying Bourdieu's sociology. This has been spelled out in a well-informed
Swedish dissertation on Bourdieu in the following way: "man (or rather the
male) is an exchanging and struggling being, inclined to strive for the
recognition of other men (in the first place from other males) and to dominate
them" (Donald Broady, Sociologi och epistemologi. Om Pierre Bourdieus
far/attarskap och denbistoriska epistemologin [Sociology and Epistemology. On
Pierre Bourdieu's Authorship and the Historical Epistemology], Stockholm:
HLS Forlag, 1990, 434).
lSCentral to 'Dewey is the notion of habit, which however is to be
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relation to the world" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive
Sociology, 122). Cp, Dewey: "Repetition is in no sense the essence of habit.
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specific acts. It means will." (Human Nature and Conduct, Carbondale and
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois UP, 1988, 32).
16For example the "war of all against all," as part of Hobbes' famous
doctrine of the state of nature, is interpreted by Schelsky as a politicalization of
Hobbesian anthropology in that it's a "mythical catchword for a general social
catastrophe" (342) that calls upon men to avoid it through action according to
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17A family resemblance of course doesn't exclude differences. Maybe it is
the case that already on the level of the concept of action important differences
are to be found among the three authors. The question then is, how far these
differences account for the radical differences in political orientation.
IsIf not otherwise stated I quote from Arnold Gehlen. Gesamtausgabe,
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, Bd. 2.Philosophische Schriften II
(1933-1938),hrsgg. v. Lothar Samson, 1980 [= GA 2], Bd. 3. Der Mensch. Seine
Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Textkritische Edition unter Einbeziehung
des gesamten Textes der 1. Auflage von 1940, hrsgg. v, Karl-Siegbert Rehberg,
1993[= GA 3].
19In an article from 1935- Der Idealismus unddieGegenwart - Gehlen even
quotes Hitler with approval (cf. GA 2, 357)! In the same article he talks about
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"the National Socialist weltanschauung" as well as "the National Socialist
philosophy and theory of science" (354). '
20See Lothar Samson, "Nachwort," GA 2, 414f£.; Karl-Siegbert Rehberg,
"Nachwort des Herausgebers," GA 3, 753f.; George Leaman, Heidegger im
Kontext, 41; Gerwin Klinger, "Freiheit als 'freiwillige Aufgabe der Freiheit.'
Arnold Gehlens Umbau desDeutschen Idealismus," Deutsche Philosophen 1933,
hrsgg. v, WoHgang Fritz Haug, Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 188£f.
2iAt one place Kant is for example frankly called a "prepragmatist" (GA 3,
639). For a connection ,ofHobbes to James and Dewey, with a reference to
Baumgarten, see GA 3, 579f.
22Gehlenin this chapter several times points to the close relation between
his notion of "supreme systems of guidance" and Alfred Rosenberg's notion of
"disciplinary ideal orders [Zuchtbilder]" (cf. GA 3, 710,733, 742).
23In the article Derldealismus und die Gegenwart from 1935 Gehlen states
that "the National Socialistweltanschauung istotal, i.e., lays claim to penetrate
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(GA 2,354). In comparison the task of a weltanschauung inDer Mensch seems to
be more restricted; it shallnot interfere in the tasks of science and (in a restricted
sense) religion. How this restriction is compatible with the claim that science
too is in need of guidance isn't quite clear to me.
2
4
It should be noted that this is a weltanschauung in which an antisemitism,
as far as I can see,plays no essential role. Gehlen's philosophical anthropology
is on the contrary said to be a "science of utmost importance, just because it's
situated before every science of race" (GA 3, 487).
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DOWNWARD TRENDS IN AUTHORITARIANISM IN
THE NETHERLANDS 1970-1992 WITH AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF WORLD DATA
Jos D. Meloen .
University ofLeiden, The Netherlands
Abstract
Three basichypotheses onauthoritarianism in TheNetherlands
areproposed. A compositeMiddendorp datasetwasused, that
included five national random samples in The Netherlands:
1970, 1975, 1980, 1985and 1992. Thefirst hypothesis main-
tainsthat theauthoritarianism syndromewill not disintegrate
in time. This stability-hypothesis wasstrongly supported in the
1970-1992 period. Thesecondhypothesis suggeste~ th~t the lev.-
elsofauthoritarianism have steadily decreased in time. Tbis
decreasing-levels hypothesis also receivedconsistentsupport..N~n
authoritarian attitudesare now supported among a majority
of the population. It is argued :hat the ~~crease ..of
authoritarianism levels cannotbeattributed to disintegration
of the authoritarianism syndrome proper. Hypothesis three
stated that The Netherlands isamong the louest m levels of
authoritarianism andstateauthoritarianism in theworld. This
lowest level-hypothesis wasexplored usingcross national da.ta
ofauthoritarian attitudesand stateauthoritarianism. Them-
dicators indeedsuggest that TheNetherlands rank a"!ong the
lowest in authoritarian attitudes as well as in state
authoritarianism, togetherwith Scandinavia, Iceland, Canada
and New Zealand. Theresults suggest that thequestofAdorno
et ale may havebeencompleted, at least for countries like The
Netherlands in the 1990s.
